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Abstract
During the early years of Guatemala’s
civil war (1960-1996), which pitted
the right-wing military regime against
leftist revolutionaries, liberation theology became popular among some in the
Latin American clergy. Fearing that this
new ideology would inspire indigenous
populations to join the rebels, the dictatorship looked to suppress the movement
inside Guatemala. This research looks
at liberation theology, its prominence in
the context of the Guatemalan civil war,
and the military dictatorship’s use of
the opposing tenants of Fundamentalist
Protestantism to counter liberation theology’s mass appeal, particularly the ideas
of institutionalized sin and the necessity
of popular action to exact change.

Appearing gaunt and with hollow,
distant eyes, Father Luis Eduardo Pellecer
stepped to the bevy of microphones at a
podium surrounded by army officers. In
a vapid, monotone voice, the Jesuit priest
regaled the Guatemalan television audience with a remarkable story that reached
deep into the soul of the nation. Originally believed to have been murdered, the
Jesuit Priest instead reemerged from 113
days of captivity on 30 September 1981.
Explaining his mysterious and violent
disappearance at the hands of unidentified men as a “self-imposed kidnapping,”
the now repentant Pellecer provided a
vivid account of the struggle for control
of the hearts and minds of the Guatemalan people interwoven into the civil war.
As if reading from a prepared script, the
seemingly brainwashed priest described
how Catholic organizations had utilized
religious mobilization in conspiring with
armed guerilla groups to build a political
base with which to spread their revolutionary ideals. Key to the development
of that following was the progressive
Catholic ideology of Liberation Theology, which up until his abduction, Father
Pellecer had embraced and actively disseminated from the pulpit. Following his
“self-imposed kidnapping,” the priest felt
the need to expose this scheme and stop
this disgraceful use of the Word of God.1
Father Pellecer’s frightening ordeal is
indicative of the role religion played in
Guatemala throughout its history and,
more specifically, its 36-year civil war.
Religion was a dangerous yet prominent aspect of life in this small Central
American country that, during those
brutal decades, seemed forsaken by God.
This conspiracy, conceived in an army
prison and reiterated from the mouth of
a tortured and troubled priest, exemplified how the military government saw
progressive Catholic activism, specifically Liberation Theology, as a threat
in the same vein as armed resistance
movements. The military regimes’ and
death squads’ attempts to suppress both
subversive activity and armed rebellion
resulted in the death or disappearance
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of an estimated 200,000 Guatemalans.2
From the late 1960s to the early 1980s,
during the most violent years of the
conflict, local and international changes
in religious doctrine and practices
exacerbated this brutality. These factors gave the concepts of religiosity and
faith a unique significance in Guatemala.
Throughout the Guatemalan civil war,
the government’s fear of the socially and
politically progressive Catholic ideology
of Liberation Theology, coupled with
their own long-held vision of modernizing the indigenous populations by
transforming their social structure, led to
a brutal program of forced conversion to
Fundamentalist Protestant ideologies that
focused on the individuality of salvation
and believer’s submission to authority.
The relationship between the Catholic
Church and the institutional state has
always been precarious in Guatemala.
During the colonial period, the interests
of these two prominent institutions frequently overlapped and conflicted. Once
the small Central American province
broke from the Spanish empire in 1824
amidst the wave of independence movements sweeping across Latin America,
the role of the Church within the state
became a key issue in the direction of
the new country. While members of the
Conservative Party wanted to maintain
the legacy of Spanish imperialism, Liberal Party members wanted to modernize the country.3 Limiting the power of
the Church was one potential method of
accomplishing this goal, since Liberals saw the Church as an impediment to
modernization and a visage of the old
colonial system.4 From the onset of the
short-lived United Provinces of Central
America in the 1820s, successive Liberal
governments in Guatemala were effective in curbing the Church’s power and
influence in the country. The government
put limitations on the Church’s ability to
own land, exact a compulsory tithe, regulate marriage, and maintain its religious
hegemony.5 Guatemala became the first
country in Latin America to allow religious freedom, potentially allowing for
the establishment of Protestant churches,
which Liberals believed were more
in line with the changing world. This
religious freedom lasted only one year,
however, as a peasant army funded and
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controlled by the conservative oligarchy
ended the Liberal government’s modernization policies.6 As a precursor of what
was to occur in the future, the use of
violence ensured the country remained
the colonial-style fiefdom desired by the
landed elite.
Religion became a key component in
this ideological battle between Conservatives and Liberals over the fate
of Guatemala. Conservative Party rule
over the next thirty years saw a return
of the Catholic Church to its former
prominence as an institution. While
practically everyone in the country was
nominally Catholic, religious practices
varied greatly along regional and social
lines, ranging from strict adherence to
Catholicism to syncretism of Mayan and
Catholic beliefs.7 The inhabitants of the
western highlands were largely of indigenous descent – approximately 70 percent
of the entire country was either Maya or
of Mayan ancestry. This segment of the
population remained largely autonomous
of the central government, basing their
social organization almost entirely upon
the cofradía – a self-governing social,
political, and economic network made up
of individual ethnicities aligned loosely
around the local Catholic Church.8 These
independent Indian social structures
allowed the people to remain free of government influence and practice their own
“Mayanized folk Catholicism.”9 The cofradía’s autonomy from both the Catholic
hierarchy and the central government
provided indigenous groups with a means
of collective resistance against Liberal
modernization schemes.10 A violent uprising led by the Liberals in 1871 brought
about a change in political leadership,
and with it a renewed attack on the role
of the Catholic Church in Guatemalan
society. Two years later, “Supreme Commander of the Guatemalan Republic”
Justo Rufino Barrios (r. 1873-1885) again
declared religious freedom in Guatemala.11 The Liberals were once again
looking to modernize the country, hoping
to break the power of both the Catholic
Church and the cofradías in the process.
In keeping with their practice of looking
to the West for inspiration, as well as for
successful models of economic development and progress, the Liberals sought to
transplant Western religion, i.e. Protes-

tantism, into Guatemala.
The presence of such a high concentration of Indians in Guatemala is important
for understanding the decision by the
Liberal regime to allow, and actively promote, Protestantism in the country. The
government believed that allowing the
free exercise of religion would encourage
European immigration to Guatemala.12 In
an age when social Darwinism prevailed,
notions of racial superiority fostered
the government’s belief that significant
structural change and westernization
could only come from the top down.13
Therefore, any attempt to modernize
Guatemala had to begin with a program of public education carried out by
Protestant missionaries.14 Implementation of the plan would further restrict the
traditional role of the Catholic Church,
while potentially providing a means with
which to indoctrinate indigenous populations with a pro-Western and submissive
ideology in the future.15 Eventually, the
government envisioned that the complete
overhaul of Guatemalan society would
occur, forcing the indigenous populations to change in the process. In 1882,
President Barrios personally went to the
Presbyterian Board of Foreign Ministers
in New York City to request missionaries be sent from the United States, and
in the following year the first Protestant
Church was established in Guatemala;
its mission was converting the wealthy
of the capital city.16 While the program
was largely unsuccessful, it opened the
way for other Protestant sects to gain a
foothold in Guatemala and perform their
missionary work.17 Because the cofradías
coalesced loosely around local Catholic
parishes, breaking the religious monopoly of the institutional Church was the
logical method to combat their power. In
its attempt to promote the modernization
of the small Central American country,
the Liberal regime openly challenged the
supremacy of the Catholic Church by
allowing Protestant missionaries to enter
the autonomous indigenous communities
in the countryside.
The modern Guatemalan state slowly
began to take shape. The autonomy of
the Indian communities began giving
way to landowning Ladinos – indigenous
Central Americans who embraced European over Native culture. This change
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in control over local politics allowed the
newly professionalized army to consolidate its power at the national level, fomenting the rise of authoritarian military
rule.18 Despite the promise of Westernization and their foray into the country’s
wealthy communities, Protestants had
little influence in this transition after their
arrival in 1883. Subsequently, they devoted their efforts primarily to missionary work among the indigenous populations, concentrating on literacy programs
and rural development projects over the
next several decades. As the world fell
into a global economic depression in the
1930s, concerns about backward Indians
slowing down the nation’s progress were
replaced by fears about a literate indigenous population rising up against the
landowning elite in a popular, “communist” revolt.19 Suddenly, the autonomous,
ignorant Indian became appealing to a
government wanting to secure its hold
on power. The regime of General Jorge
Ubico (r. 1931-1944) therefore began to
limit the number of Protestant missionaries allowed into the country, despite
its association with the Liberal Party.20
Ubico’s actions regarding both Indians
and Protestant missionaries were indicative of how the Guatemalan ruling class
viewed religion as nothing more than a
tool to advance their political agenda.
Since Guatemalan independence in 1824,
the elites had used religion as a means
to achieve social control. Whichever
religious ideology the authorities could
manipulate to ensure their hold on power
while maintaining Indigenous complacency was the version they would officially espouse. While religion may have
embodied the Word of God, it became
the will of the Guatemalan government.
This all began to change in 1944 with
the postscripted “ten years of spring.”21 A
military coup labeled the “October Revolution” and subsequent open elections
ushered Juan José Arevalo (r. 1944-1951)
into power as President of Guatemala.
Invoking the nation’s unique religious
situation, Arevalo referred to his plan
for Guatemala as “spiritual socialism.”22
He believed that neither Marxism nor
capitalism on their own were viable
economic systems for Guatemala; his
policy was an innovative precursor to
Chilean President Salvador Allende’s
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experiment in finding a “third way.”
Instead, Arevalo’s strategies of economic
nationalism, development projects,
popular organization, and reforms in
land, labor, and education policies began
moving Guatemala towards becoming
a more equitable country.23 Arevalo’s
administration promised to provide all
of Guatemala’s people with a “square
deal,” which meant avoiding the abuses
and corruptions of the past, including
the use of religion as a tool of social
manipulation.24 Nonetheless, the Arevalo
government reinstituted past policies
by utilizing Evangelical missionaries to
implement a nationwide basic education
project aimed at the poor.25 However,
instead of attempting to indoctrinate
indigenous communities into a pro-Western ideology, the Arevalo administration
drew upon Protestant missionaries because of their belief that literal reading of
the Bible is necessary for salvation.26 The
Guatemalan government again favored
Protestantism, but this time as a tool to
improve literacy and society in general
by a government working for the benefit
of the entire population.
While President Arevalo had some
support from Protestant groups, by 1951
the newly elected President Jacobo
Arbenz Guzmán (r. 1951-1954) incurred
the wrath of Guatemala’s religious
communities. Despite his baptism as a
Protestant, Arbenz’s reputation as a communist sympathizer led all but the most
radically leftist religious away from the
newly elected President.27 The conservative Guatemalan Catholic Church
was perhaps the most vocal religious
opponent of the President, working fervently to mobilize opposition within the
country.28 Weakened from over 100 years
of Liberal onslaughts, fear that a communist government would completely
stamp them out led the Church to oppose
vehemently what they believed were
socialist tendencies in the democratic
government.29 Yet with only 132 priests
throughout the entire country in 1950,
their opposition was ineffective at best.30
Such tactics were not needed, however,
as there were other, more powerful entities that felt threatened by Guatemala’s
emerging democracy.
External forces, namely the United
Fruit Company (UFCO) and the United

States government, were more than
adequate to end Guatemala’s democratic
experiment. These outside groups, by
providing funding, training, and air
support for a conservative counterrevolutionary movement led by Colonel
Carlos Castillo Armas, forced Arbenz
to resign on 27 June 1954.31 With help
from the United States government, both
Guatemala and UFCO’s lucrative banana
plantations were safe from the threat of
international communism sinisterly posing under the guise of a democratically
elected administration. In the name of
thwarting communism, efforts to bring
about true, progressive modernization
were jettisoned in one swift and decisive
act, this time by the very country looked
upon as a model. The military once again
ruled Guatemala, and it would work to
maintain that control at any cost.
Shortly after the coup, Colonel Carlos
Castillo Armas (r. 1954-1957) took
power as the country’s president with the
goal of undoing the progressive reforms
of the previous administration. Because
the new president had received strong
support in the months leading up to the
coup from the conservative Catholic
Church, the constitution drafted after the
change in government contained a very
pro-clerical slant, giving the institution back privileges it had not had since
before independence.32 In this time of
upheaval, the Protestant groups that had
worked closely with the Arevalo government were labeled as communist sympathizers.33 Indigenous converts in the
western highlands subsequently became
the victims of sporadic anti-communist
attacks.34 Despite the conservative fervor
of the new U.S.-backed regime, Castillo
Armas’s political inclinations were that
of a traditional, unreconstructed Liberal.35 Therefore, while the government
ignored the random violence perpetrated
against Protestants because of the desire
to see Guatemala modernize, Castillo Armas did not allow the new constitution to
reinstate Catholicism as the official state
religion.36 Although some Protestants had
worked with the previous “communist”
regime, not all were expelled from Guatemala in the wave of anti-communist
zeal due to the long-standing idea that
different, more conformist Protestant
ideologies afforded the country the best
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chance for modernization. The military
regime could still exploit ideologies that
focused on individual salvation, personal
responsibility, and submission to authority instead of those that promoted literacy
and social change. The Guatemalan
government needed a more complacent
version of Christianity, either Protestant
or Catholic, to be disseminated among
the indigenous population if their modernization schemes were ever to succeed.
The Catholic hierarchy hoped to use
its relationship with the new right-wing
government to rebuild the power and
prominence of the Church. Despite still
having to deal with its upstart competitor
for the souls of the Guatemalan masses,
one important privilege the Catholic
Church regained was the return of foreign religious to the country.37 The hierarchy initially believed this would benefit
the institution, since the new religious
would help replenish the understaffed
ranks of the Church. The hierarchy also
believed that their support of the coup
would ensure that the government would
no longer work against the institution’s
attempts to keep Catholicism relevant in
Guatemala. The Church expected that
their denunciation of the Arbenz administration would end the government’s
love affair with Protestantism. Unbeknownst to the Guatemalan Catholic
hierarchy, however, events would shortly
transpire that would change the look, and
the message, of Catholicism throughout
Latin America and the world. To the
chagrin of the conservative Guatemalan
hierarchy, the Church would become
relevant in a completely new way.
Changes associated with the convening of Second Vatican Ecumenical
Council in Rome from 1962 to 1965
ultimately led to the creation and development of Liberation Theology. Later
known as Vatican II, Pope John XXIII
summoned this meeting of the Catholic
leadership from all over the world to deal
with modernizing the archaic institution.
Out of this congregation, the Church
changed from a generally conservative,
pro-establishment institution to one that
supported democracy, human rights,
and social change.38 While this meeting initiated a fundamental shift within
the Church around the world, the most
important aspect of Vatican II for the
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Church in Latin America was that it led
some in the hierarchy to look more critically at their Church and the societies
in which they lived.39 This critical look
crystallized in 1968 at the Latin American Bishop’s Conference in Medellin,
Colombia. What emerged from Medellin
was a different Church, one that in theory
no longer expected the poor to stoically
face their lot in life and obediently await
entrance to heaven as the reward for their
suffering.40 Drawing on Latin America’s
economic and international situation,
socially and politically progressive
members of the Church hierarchy gave
anti-imperialism, class struggle, and
social revolution a previously unknown
Christian character.41 They argued that
Christians should be active and engaged
in working towards a positive transformation of society and the world.42 In Medellin, an ideology emerged in which its
adherents viewed sin no longer solely as
an individual issue but as an institutional
problem.43 In addition to these changes
in outlook, there was also a shift in
ideas concerning the secular role of the
Church. Some within the Church were so
involved with advancing the cause of the
poor and disenfranchised that a group of
Bishops at Medellin declared:
We express our desire to be very
close always to those who work in
the self-denying apostolate with
the poor in order that they will
always feel our encouragement
and know that we will not listen to
parties interested in distorting their
work.44
In Latin America, Liberation Theology
eventually evolved out of this fundamental transformation in Catholic doctrine.
Author Philip Berryman defined this
ideology as:
•
•
•

An interpretation of Christian faith out of the suffering,
struggle, and hope of the poor;
A critique of society and the
ideologies sustaining it;
A critique of the activity of the
Church and of Christians from
the angle of the poor.45

The Catholic Church finally took notice
of the dismal poverty, lavish wealth, and
political repression that were rampant
throughout Latin America. At both Vatican II and the Latin American Bishop’s
Conference, the hierarchy reevaluated
the official stance on the temporal role
of the Church and a brave few within
the clergy decided to stand up and take
action. Among the ranks of those who
could no longer sit idly by, witnessing
the diabolic destruction of their societies,
Liberation Theology was born.
In 1971 Gustavo Gutiérrez wrote a
seminal book in which he describes the
transformation taking place in the Catholic Church throughout Latin America.
The term Liberation Theology originated
from Gutiérrez’s book entitled A Theology of Liberation. Liberation Theology
sought to address means with which to
escape from the poverty that enslaved
the vast majority of Latin Americans.
Gutiérrez argued that there was a need to
end the cycle of dependence that plagues
Latin American countries in relation to
the West.46 In advocating such a change,
Gutiérrez utilized ideas associated with
dependency theory, which states that the
leading powers of the world (particularly
the United States) have used their economic strength to ensure Latin America’s
development is dependent solely on
the interests of those same powers.47
Instead of developing a diverse economy
similar to those nations in the industrialized world, these dependent countries
export primary goods, such as aluminum, bananas, cotton, etc., controlled by
the wealthy elite, making a subjugated
working class necessary to ensure the
system’s smooth operation.48 With the
world split along the ideological lines of
the Cold War, Gutiérrez’s message to end
this system was highly controversial. The
military leaders of many Latin American
countries, such as Guatemala, considered
arguments like Gutiérrez’s, which did not
overtly advocate the free-market capitalist ideologies of the Western world, akin
to communism and a potential danger to
their hold on social control.
While Gutiérrez never actually
advocates an overt Marxist-Leninist
overthrow of the capitalist system in
his book, he phrases the call for liberation within a framework of homegrown,
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hemispheric socialist change.49 What
sets Gutiérrez’s ideology apart from
other calls for revolution is the inherent
Christian component of his message. He
seeks to bring Marxism into the Christian
fold within the specific Latin American context.50 Because an anti-socialist
doctrine had imbued Christianity for so
long, it was the duty of Liberationists
such as Gutiérrez to free people from
the ideological fallacies associated with
socialism.51 Given the abject poverty
and opulent wealth of Latin America and
the changes that had occurred within the
Church’s doctrine, there was no other
option but for Christians to side with the
revolutionaries, in spirit at least if not in
action.52 Gutiérrez goes so far as to encourage and validate justifiable violence
perpetrated at the hands of those fighting
for liberation against the weapons and
armies of oppression and dependence.53
Liberation Theology openly challenged
the role of the Catholic Church as the
spiritual sanctuary of Latin America’s
wealthy elite. Contrary to the seemingly
tacit support of Liberation Theology
from Vatican II and the Medellin Conference, the ideology created divisions
within the Catholic Church unseen since
the Reformation.54 There was an open
battle within the Church between those
adopting the “preferential option for the
poor” and those who still adhered to “the
values of tradition, the institutional and
sacral aspects of the Church, and hierarchical authority.”55 In a time of cultural
change at the grassroots level, albeit with
global ramifications, not even the Catholic Church could avoid the ominous
upheaval looming on the horizon.
Despite the reluctance of some within
the highest levels of the Church hierarchy to change, radical priests and lay
workers were not the only adherents to
Liberation Theology. Many members of
the Catholic Church throughout Latin
America subscribed to the ideology and
promoted it in writings, in sermons, and
in their parishes. They used the ideology to give new perspective to a variety
of subjects, including Christianity’s role
in the political realm, the morality of
resistance to repression, and the need for
social justice.56 Fundamental to Liberation Theology is a passage from the
bishops at Vatican II that states:
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In the Old Testament God reveals
himself to us as the liberator of
the oppressed and the defender
of the poor, demanding from man
faith in him and justice towards
man’s neighbour. It is only in the
observance of the duties of justice
that God is truly recognized as the
liberator of the oppressed…. Christ
lived his life in the world as a total
giving of himself to God for the
salvation and liberation of men.57
Because issues of justice and oppression were so pertinent to their particular diocese, many bishops throughout
Latin America slowly began converting
to the tenets of Liberation Theology.
Gone were the days when the Church
promoted social action while simultaneously denouncing any participation in
the realm of politics.58 In the span of
just over a decade, the Church in Latin
America went from working hand-inhand with the established oligarchy in
fighting popular uprisings it perceived
to be communist to having prominent
priests disseminate ideas that violent
revolution may in fact be justified by the
teachings of Jesus Christ. During this
transitional period within the Church, religious involved with the Catholic Action
program from all over the world came
to Guatemala. Brought in by Archbishop
Mariano Rossell y Arellano shortly after
the U.S.-backed coup in 1954, their task
consisted of strengthening the Church
and reenergizing the faithful.
Once these priests and workers began
to proselytize in the northwestern highlands of Guatemala, they saw the living
conditions the indigenous population
faced in Departments such as Huehuetenango, Quiché, Chimaltenango, and
Alta Verapaz. This new perspective
made the ecclesiastical emphasis of their
mission seem inconsequential when
compared with efforts to improve the
social and economic conditions of their
parishioners.59 Traditionally a conservative organization, members of Catholic
Action that came to Guatemala began
taking progressive stances because of
the circumstances they witnessed in the
country.60 Foreign Catholic priests and
workers in Guatemala became more concerned with economic development and

education projects, working in popular
movements at the community level in
predominately indigenous areas.61 This
is how Christian base communities developed. These grassroots organizations
allowed people to organize and become
involved in participatory democracy,
albeit only at the local level.62 The
participants, called catechists, selected
leaders from their own ranks who then
became responsible for disseminating
the message of Liberation Theology.63
While these communities began after
the arrival of foreign Catholic workers
following the 1954 coup, they proved to
be the most important, and most subversive, work of Catholic activists among
the people of Guatemala during the civil
war.64 In the department of Quiché, for
example, by the late 1970s there were
several thousand catechists with close
ties to traditional indigenous communities.65 These communities harkened back
to the cofradía and openly challenged
the existing political and social order,
incurring the wrath of those in control
of the country’s economic and political
machinery.
With the help of both these indigenous
and foreign adherents to Liberation
Theology, the peasantry began to take on
a more active role in resisting oppression. On a theoretical level, the doctrine
of bettering the lives of the poor through
economic and political development was
more important to Liberation Theology
than the principle of heavenly salvation through faith in Christ.66 Therefore,
the local residents and catechists, not
the priests, made all major decisions
concerning the base communities.67 With
assistance from the religious, indigenous
villages started cooperatives through
which they bypassed merchants looking
to exploit what little resources they possessed.68 Unfortunately, these cooperatives could only help those indigenous
people with sufficient financial means.
Consequently, many on both sides of
the political spectrum questioned their
validity. While some Indians perceived
the cooperatives as doing nothing for
the landless peasantry, the overzealous
government viewed them as communist
subterfuges.69 Despite these setbacks,
Catholic workers emphasized collectively working together for the advance-
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ment of all; how exploitative practices
were sinful in the eyes of the Lord; and
how Jesus Christ had fought against
imperialistic practices in his time.70 Thus,
the peasant communities of Guatemala
began utilizing the strategies that would
later evolve into a theology of liberation
before the ideology had even been given
its name.
Among the influx of Catholic Action
religious entering the country, perhaps
the most prolific was the Maryknoll
Order based in New York. Although the
religious order had never identified with
any specific political ideology, this began
to change when the Maryknoll priests
and nuns began their work in Guatemala.
By identifying sin as a social phenomenon, Liberation Theology tended to blur
the line between religion and politics.71
The conditions that the religious workers saw led some of them to look for
ways outside the spiritual realm to exact
change, even advocating the necessary
use of violence.72 A specific group of religious workers exceeding their traditional
role as God’s representatives and becoming intimately involved in the revolutionary cause spawned what became known
in Guatemala as the “Melville case.”73
This incident, while being the first of
many involving religious revolutionaries in the country, exemplified what the
Guatemalan military regime feared most
about progressive Catholic activists: the
use of religion to justify taking up arms
in the name of social justice.
Two priests, Tom and Art Melville,
along with a nun named Marian Peter,
had been working in Guatemala since
the 1950s; they and other Maryknollers
were some of the first foreign religious
to arrive in the country via Catholic Action. While the Melville brothers were
proselytizing in the indigenous western
highlands, Sister Marian was teaching in
an upper-class high school in Guatemala
City.74 As their work progressed, the
brothers began to realize the limitations
of development projects in remedying
the problems of the peasantry. Moreover, Christian base communities, while
helping to spread the ideas of the new
Liberation Theology, were doing little to
end government oppression and violence. Sister Marian Peter, also feeling a
sense of frustration, began to take high
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school students to work with the rural
poor in these base communities.75 She
too became disillusioned with the lack of
progress. These religious searched for a
way to bring about reform, leading them
into a relationship with other groups
of people working towards revolution,
elevating the use of religion as a weapon
of war in Guatemala to a new level.
Seeing firsthand the conditions faced
by the rural poor of Guatemala, these
religious workers realized that revolution was the only way to break the cycle
of poverty and provide a ray of hope for
the country’s oppressed. Utilizing the
connections of some of Sister Marian’s
students, the three contacted the guerilla leader Luis Turcios Lima in 1967
and decided to join the revolution.76
The rebels, from the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes, or Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR), utilized their new connections
with these three religious to recruit from
the indigenous communities, which had
traditionally sought autonomy and were
reluctant to join Ladino-led resistance
movements like the FAR.77 The FAR and
subsequent rebel groups realized that
Church organizations, whether they were
base communities or similar progressive
groups, had much better relationships
and communication with indigenous
communities.78 At this time, however, the
rebels had nearly been annihilated by a
particularly violent counter insurgency
campaign; this was their last ditch effort at maintaining their presence in the
country.79 Though the rebels were trying
to develop both a Christian and an indigenous presence in their revolution, it was
to no avail. Both Church and government
officials discovered the plan, expelling
the Melvilles (along with Sister Marian)
from Guatemala.80 This incident exemplified for the army the latent danger posed
by progressive members of the Church
to the ruling oligarchy’s monopoly on
power and control. Grassroots work done
by Catholic activists could potentially
threaten the oligarchy’s iron grip on the
indigenous peasant majority, even more
so than isolated bands of rebels constantly on the run from the U.S.-funded
and -trained military. This concern of
the military would lead to the start of a
second, ideological front in the civil war,
one to maintain social control more ef-

fectively.
While many foreign workers connected with the Catholic Church were involved with the poor in developing ways
to better their lives, Protestant churches
were actively expanding in Guatemala.
Earlier, unsuccessful forays into the
realm of politics left these churches
advocating a more otherworldly message
instead of proselytizing about social ills
and the need for popular action to enact
societal change. As violence associated
with the civil war increased in the mid1960s, some people turned to Protestant
churches looking for answers. Millenarianist neo-Pentecostal sects preaching
individual salvation for the righteous
and obedience to authority in seemingly
apocalyptic times broke off from the
traditional churches.81 Eventually these
neo-Pentecostal churches began to split
as well, creating homegrown Guatemalan
congregations, usually meeting in people’s homes and often consisting of only
a few members.82 While these churches
were anti-Catholic in nature, they
espoused patriotism and the doctrinal
message of resignation – the traditionally
conservative belief in accepting one’s
fate in life and submitting to the will of
authority. 83 The military government
hoped to utilize this message in order to
counter the social activism embraced by
the Liberationists in the indigenous communities. While Guatemalan Protestant
sects were branching off into apocalyptic
realms completely devoid of political involvement, the Guatemalan government
was endeavoring to exploit the Pentecostal message as another tool of social
control.
This situation came to fruition, oddly
enough, with an act of nature. Early
in the morning of 4 February 1976, an
earthquake that registered 7.5 on the
Richter scale struck the north-central part
of the country. Over 22,000 people died,
three times that number was seriously
injured, and another one million people
– nearly one-sixth of the country – were
homeless after the catastrophe.84 The
tragedy affected the poor in Guatemala
City and the Department of Chimaltenango the worst since their adobe homes
were poorly constructed and hence more
susceptible to damage from the cataclysmic tremor.85 This devastating event
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made it necessary for the government
to ask outside countries, particularly the
United States, for help. In addition to
aid from the U.S. government, a large
amount of resources came by way of
North American Protestant churches,
which saw the earthquake as an opportunity to further proselytizing efforts in
a country seemingly forsaken by God.86
While these churches spent their resources in rebuilding the homes of the poor
(while many of whom actually needed
help planting their crops before it was
too late in the season), their recruitment
efforts focused largely on the wealthy
elite of Guatemala City, including future
President José Efraín Ríos Montt.87
Despite the fact that these churches
concentrated their recruitment efforts
almost exclusively on the Guatemalan
elite, the wealthy were not the only ones
that joined the congregations. Overall
church membership jumped almost fifteen percent in the months immediately
following the earthquake.88 This number
is deceiving, however, as the monetary
generosity bestowed upon those who
adhered to the benefactor’s protestant
religious beliefs played a major part in
increasing the number of converts to the
flock.89 For the government, this rise in
conversions to Protestantism was another
positive development in their ongoing
effort to modernize Guatemala. In addition to the arrival of foreign missionaries
and relief efforts, the earthquake and
ensuing chaos served as a catalyst for
already rapacious land seizures by people
searching for oil deposits or fertile cattle
lands.90 These assaults on both their
traditional ways of life and their lands
now forced indigenous people who once
sought autonomy to look for ways in
which to mobilize resistance.
As the threat of losing their land compounded the ever-present violence, the
peasantry began to look for ways to mobilize. Rebel groups consisting of survivors of the first counterinsurgency campaigns in the 1960s began reemerging
in indigenous regions and establishing
relations with the residents.91 Following
the example of the Catholic activists and
Liberationists, the rebel groups worked
to create better, more productive relationships with the indigenous populations.
They began to work together with indig-
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enous populations on issues in need of
immediate attention, such as the killing
of right-wing landowners and military
officers who were excessively abusive.92
Along with rebel groups, activist Catholic priests were still working in Guatemala. The indigenous communities that had
been involved in base communities, and
that had seen the brunt of the military’s
violence in suppressing the first wave of
rebel activities, began to organize under
the leadership of these Catholic priests.93
On 29 May 1978, a group of Kekchi
Indians descended on the northern town
of Panzos to ask authorities for help in
protecting them from inevitable land
seizures.94 Following the standard policy
of violently suppressing any confrontation, the military unleashed its destructive forces on the unarmed group of
Indians, killing well over one hundred.95
This massacre signaled the start of the
most brutal years of the Guatemalan
civil war, when just over a month later
General Fernando Romeo Lucas García
(r. 1978-1981) succeeded General Kjell
Eugenio Laugerud García (r. 1974-1978)
as president in another fraudulent election. The Lucas presidency would be the
most corrupt and violent reign of terror
that Guatemala had witnessed up to that
point in the nearly two-decade-long civil
war.
This became the most brutal period
of the war as the guerillas became more
politically and militarily active than
at any other point in the conflict. One
of the main reasons for this was that
the guerilla organizations, which had
largely been comprised of middle-class
Ladinos during the 1960s, now had the
support of a large number of the Indians
in the regions where they operated.96 A
group known as Ejercito Guerrillero de
los Pobres, or the Guerilla Army of the
Poor (EGP), began briefly occupying
regions of the highlands, and by mid1979, another group called Organización
Pueblo en Armas, or the People-in-Arms
Organization (ORPA) began utilizing the
same tactics.97 Indigenous people were
collaborating with, and even joining,
these resistance groups in ever-increasing
numbers.98 For the first time in the Guatemalan civil war, revolutionary groups
began taking the offensive.99 Because
Catholic activists had first organized the

indigenous into base communities and
served as the conduit for Liberation Theology’s “preferential option for the poor,”
Catholics bore the brunt of the political
violence during the Lucas regime.100 Because of the work that Catholic activists
had done during the 1960s, the regions
where base communities were located
emerged as the areas in which the rebels
had the most success.101 In retaliation, by
the end of 1979 the army had essentially
put the Indigenous communities in the
northwest highlands under siege.102 In
January 1980, a large group of Indians
came to the capital to plead their case to
the public. What followed would catapult
the civil war onto the international stage
and usher in the beginning of an even
greater level of violence in the battle for
the hearts and minds of the Guatemalan
peasantry.
On 31 January 1980, twenty-three
peasants, along with five labor and
university leaders, took over the Spanish
embassy in Guatemala City. Many who
were involved in the occupation were
themselves Catholic activists.103 Although the Spanish ambassador Máximo
Cajal was willing to meet with the occupiers, feeling that their actions were
justified considering what was transpiring in their communities, several hundred
police and military personnel arrived at
the embassy and placed it under siege.104
In spite of the Ambassador’s protests,
the Guatemalan authorities attacked
the embassy, causing an explosion and
subsequent fire.105 The pleas of onlookers went unheeded as the Guatemalan
authorities, refusing to allow firefighters
on the scene, watched as twenty-seven
of the twenty-eight occupiers and twelve
of their hostages burned to death in the
blaze.106 Despite international outrage
and a severance of diplomatic relations
by Spain, the “Spanish Embassy massacre” only increased the government’s
repression of the indigenous communities, initiating the most brutal phase of
the war and the beginning of the push
towards coerced Protestant conversion.
Anyone associated with Catholicism in
the indigenous regions of Guatemala was
already under intense government subjugation. Since guerillas were difficult
to find or identify, and could potentially
defend themselves, the army went after
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anyone they believed was associated
with the resistance, particularly those
participating in Catholic activism.107
Consequently, those who were not politically active converted to Protestantism in
large numbers to avoid the brunt of the
government’s force.108 This political and
religious expediency was not, however,
the only appeal of Protestantism to Guatemalans mired in a brutal, decades-long
civil war. As Virginia Garrard-Burnett
explains:
The attraction of such churches
was plain: not only did their message of a violent chaotic, unjust,
and sinful world reflect believers’
reality, but it also rendered a larger
meaning and cosmic plan from
nearly incomprehensible terror. For
believers, the promise of redemption in the hereafter was not simply
deferred gratification, or “pie in
the sky,” but a time for vindication,
justice, empowerment, and reunion
for the poor and oppressed, the
inheritors of the earth entitled by
Jesus Himself on the Sermon on
the Mount.109
It was not just the idea of redemption
in the afterlife, the financial help from
missionaries, or the protection from the
army that made Protestantism appealing
to some indigenous Guatemalans. The
churches had a welcoming atmosphere
of popular religiosity, with services that
often included time for singing, dancing, and physical gestures towards the
heavens.110 Compared to the stodginess
of traditional Catholic mass, this visceral appeal contributed substantially to
Protestant growth.111 There were many
non-political conditions contributing to
the unprecedented growth of Protestant
churches in Guatemala. Nonetheless,
these changes in the country’s spirituality
would have immense political ramifications, especially for its most impoverished and marginalized inhabitants.
The government was cognizant of
this rise in Protestantism and believed
that they could utilize it to create a new
political base. If Protestants literally adhered to the biblical passage to “submit
to the authority in power,” it could counteract the Catholic activism occurring in
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the indigenous highlands.112 Despite the
military’s desire for an obedient Protestant populous, not all Protestants aligned
themselves with the oppressive apparatus
of the state. While a very small number
of Protestants did join the rebels, for the
most part they tacitly, and oftentimes
actively, supported the military dictatorship.113 Their support, however, was
often a survival strategy rather than a
specific act of defiance against the rebels.
For example, during the early 1980s in
the Ixil town of Cotzal, located in the
Quiché Department where the guerillas
had a high level of support, the Protestant congregation of the Full Gospel
Church of God openly reported on guerilla activities and collaborated with the
army.114 They did this under duress in an
effort to prevent their families, and their
church, from falling victim to the army’s
scorched-earth policies.115 Promotion of
Protestantism was the tentative policy of
the military government at the end of the
1970s and the beginning of the 1980s.
The ascension of a Fundamentalist Protestant to the presidency, however, created
a full-scale religious battle in the countryside, where forced coercion became
a way of life throughout the indigenous
regions of Guatemala.
With every escalation in violence
by the military, there was a concomitant increase in guerilla activity in the
highlands. In January 1982, all four of
Guatemala’s guerilla groups announced
they were joining forces and becoming
the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional
Guatemalteca, or Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (URNG).116 These
guerillas consolidated their power and
were becoming a significant threat. The
military and oligarchy only had to look
at what had transpired in neighboring
Nicaragua, where a popular revolution
just a few years earlier had toppled the
Somoza family from power. The Guatemalan military regime believed that
they needed to take drastic action in
order to end this potential threat, and
conventional violence was only strengthening the opposition’s support. Young
military officers, believing that the Lucas
regime’s gross corruption was undermining the war against the guerillas,
orchestrated a coup to usher in a new era
of counterrevolutionary warfare.117 The

extensive violence and brutality of the
war waged by the Lucas regime, while
effective in killing peasants and Catholic
activists, had failed in eradicating the
guerillas. The next step was one that had
been in development for one hundred
years, an attempt at a total transformation
that would completely alter Guatemalan
society and forever end any political opposition by imposing God’s Will of conformity and obedience onto the people of
the small Central American nation.
Guatemala needed a fundamentalist
Protestant to lead the country through
this monumental societal change. Herein
lies the reason why the young officers
who orchestrated the golpe (coup) in
1982 chose the evangelical Efraín Ríos
Montt to be president (r. 1982-1983),
literally plucking him from teaching
Sunday school at the Word Church in
Guatemala City to be the next military
dictator of the country.118 Seeing this
conflict through a strictly religious
perspective, the “born-again” Christian
understood the guerilla movement to be a
result of moral failings within the country.119 In order to end what Ríos Montt
saw as the guerillas' assault on Guatemalan values, he would create “La Nueva
Guatemala,” or the New Guatemala.120
This would fundamentally change society by basing it solely on the principles
of morality, obedience to authority, and
national unity.121 Ever since the introduction of Protestantism a century earlier,
the Guatemalan government had sought
to create a compliant, “modern” population. Through unprecedented violence in
the name of eradicating a rebellion, this
modernization was about to be realized
by a zealously fundamentalist President
in the midst of a brutal civil war. The
indigenous people of Guatemala would
arrive in the modern Western world,
not through development projects and
proselytizing but through unimaginable
death, destruction, and forced conversion.
Modernity and social peace would
be achieved by way of a scorchedearth policy the new President referred
to as “fusiles y frijoles,” or “bullets
and beans.”122 The “bullets” facet of
the program, destroying the guerilla’s
relationship with the indigenous communities, was summed up best by one
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army officer’s statement: “If you are
with us, we’ll feed you, if you’re against
us, we’ll kill you.”123 The “beans” portion of this brutal pacification strategy
consisted of creating the La Fundación
de Ayuda al Pueblo Indígena, or the
Foundation for Aid to the Indian People
(FUNDAPI).124 Ríos Montt enlisted
members of the Word Church (of which
he was a member) to create an organization for administering the contributions
from North American evangelicals in
order to provide food, shelter, clothing,
and medicine to the refugees created
by the counterinsurgency campaign.125
In the process of razing over 440 villages to the ground, the military created
FUNDAPI clients by displacing more
than one million people.126 Another
aspect of the “bullets and beans” plan
was the vast expansion of the patrullas
de autodefensa civil, or civil defense
patrols (PACs), that originated under the
Lucas regime.127 The army commanders
of the PACs conscripted male Indians to
fight against the rebels, giving them only
wooden weapons if any at all.128 Instead
of leaving the vast indigenous peasantry
potentially to fight against the military,
the PACs forced them to combat the rebels who were theoretically on their side
in the liberation struggle. These civilian militias were ragtag armies of men
forced to go to war in the advancement
of their own oppression. With a policy of
burning people’s homes and then using
potential starvation to force them to fight
against their own interests, it is understandable why the government sought a
way to enforce a sense of conformity and
justification on these subjugated people.
Indoctrination was vital to inculcate
this sense of conformity. The “bullets
and beans” policy targeted Catholic
activists involved in Christian base communities to the extent that in May 1982,
the nation’s bishops described what was
happening in Guatemala’s indigenous
highlands as a “genocide.”129 They were
only the first to claim this, however,
as both Amnesty International and the
United Nations later did so as well.130
The military regime seemingly deemed
everyone associated with Catholicism to
be a communist and hunted them down
like criminals. This coincided with a
particularly large growth in membership
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among Protestant churches during the
early 1980s, especially in those Churches
that were encouraged by the government to evangelize in the highland war
zones.131 This growth was most apparent
in “model villages,” where the FUNDAPI could use religious affiliation as a
condition for aide. These work camps,
created and controlled by the army and
built atop the ruins of destroyed communities by the relocated survivors of the
“bullets and beans” campaign, were the
penultimate step in the violent crusade to
ensure social control.132 Those indigenous
who survived would be the first inhabitants of a brave new Guatemala.
Under constant surveillance and the
guise of benevolence, these villages
constituted a sinister attempt to modernize the campesinos, or peasants, through
indoctrination and integration into the
New Guatemala.133 The government tried
to destroy traditional ethnic unity and
isolate individuals by purposefully placing people from different villages and
language groups together.134 While everyone was stripped of their ethnic identity
and forced to learn and speak only Spanish, the only outside institutions that were
allowed into these villages were Protestant Churches and the FUNDAPI.135 The
number of Protestant converts swelled in
these model villages because the military
perceived those that did not convert as
ostensibly opposing the government’s
program. This was a critical aspect of
the Guatemalan military’s psychological
war against the indigenous population.
With hundreds of thousands of people
displaced and impoverished, the military
left them with nowhere to turn but these
horrific resettlement centers. The government sought to ensure that the “rebellious” Indians transformed into people
grateful for the generosity shown them
and who thank God for the life given
to them. This was more than a military
assault on guerilla activity or a violent
insurgency; it was an all-out genocidal
campaign pitting Evangelical Protestantism against Liberation Theology, with the
indigenous population caught in the middle. The Guatemalan government, under
fundamentalist President Efraín Ríos
Montt, used violence and fear to convert
indigenous society into something that
better suited the military regime’s desire

for conformity and submission.
The crowning day for that transformation was to be the centennial celebration of Protestantism in Guatemala. In
October 1982 the Argentine evangelist
Luis Palau, renowned as “the Latin Billy
Graham,” spoke to an estimated half
million people in Guatemala City on
the subject of Ríos Montt’s miracle.136
On the surface, it seemed as though the
“bullets and beans” campaign had done
to both Guatemalan Catholicism and
society in a few short months what the
government, through traditional Protestant missionaries, had been working
at for over a century. Yet the Protestant
experiment had cracks in its foundation.
Because the numerous sects and factions
of the Protestant community were not
united squarely behind the President,
there was little opposition when, as often
happened with Guatemalan Presidents,
Ríos Montt was ousted in a golpe on 8
August 1983.137 Once the brutality of his
campaign ended the crisis in the countryside, disabled Catholic activism, and put
the rebels back on the defensive, Ríos
Montt’s inability to make headway in the
country’s economic matters caused him
to lose the support of the landed oligarchy.138 His cultural revolution was not as
important to those in power as the price
of coffee on the futures market. Nonetheless, Ríos Montt had been successful in
destroying the indigenous revolution.
Through the death of almost one-quarter
million people, and the destruction of the
survivor’s traditional way of life, General
Ríos Montt had “miraculously” brought
modernization to the indigenous people
of Guatemala.
The Ríos Montt administration tried to
force the indigenous to remake their entire society and abandon their beliefs or
face the government’s wrath. That policy
worked so well that the conversion rate
to Protestantism among the indigenous
continued to rise until it leveled out in
1985 at around ten percent a year.139
Throughout the Guatemalan civil war,
when right-wing Protestants came into
conflict with left-wing Catholic activists,
both religious and political differences
overlapped and developed into what in
some instances resembled a holy war.140
The threat of unspeakable violence and
death notwithstanding, the indigenous
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community internalized the fundamentalist message of conformity and obedience,
replacing Liberation Theology’s message
of liberty and justice for all.
This had been the decades-old plan
of the military government. In order to
placate their concerns about Liberation
Theology and peasant social activism,
the oligarchy-military cabal, seeing the
already occurring rise in Protestantism,
actively planned and initiated a strategy
to convert the peasant population to a
more palatable religious ideology. The
long-held position of Protestantism as
a tool of modernization in Guatemala,
coupled with the violence occurring
at the hands of the military, allowed
for a strategy of Protestant conversion
on a mass scale. The authorities both
forcefully pushed modernization on
the Indigenous populations and refuted
Catholic-based ideas of social change
and revolution. This occurred extensively
and with the most brutality in the “model
villages” that the military regime created
to restructure Guatemalan indigenous
society. The dictatorship was attempting
to create an entirely new society, free of
dissent and subversion, modeled after the
conservative, Protestant countries of the
West. They carried out this goal through
violence, internment, enslavement, and
attempted indoctrination and brainwashing of over 60 percent of the country’s
population.
The capture and brainwashing of
Father Pellecer is reminiscent of the
situation faced by the indigenous people
of Guatemala. Seeing Liberation Theology as a threat, the military government
tried to alter the mindset of the people
to better suit its plans for the country.
David Stoll, in his contribution to Robert
Carmack’s compilation “Harvest of Violence,” quotes an evangelical missionary
discussing the confrontation between
Fundamentalist Protestantism and Liberation Theology as stating that Central America was “one of the strategic
battlefields in the spiritual warfare over
the allegiances and eternal destiny of the
world’s inhabitants.”141 Indeed, to these
people they were soldiers in a war; a war
for the hearts and minds of the indigenous population that eventually reaped
incredible havoc on an entire generation
of Guatemalans in an attempt by the
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military to maintain social control. Liberation Theology threatened the elite’s
control over Guatemalan society, while
Fundamentalist Protestantism gave hope
to its preservation. While Guatemala may
have seemed forsaken by God, in the
eyes of those in power, God was working to help create, to quote the Fundamentalist Protestant former Guatemalan
President Efraín Ríos Montt, “the new
Israel of Central America.”142 
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